This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. It is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. The first section of the paper discusses main principles that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference for water cooperation. In the second part, competing claims are analysed to see how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have provided deliberately conflicting interpretations over "International rivers", "equitable and reasonable utilization", "no harm", "prior notification" and "consultation" to derive negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. Conclusions point to the understanding of water law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors' constraints and options and enhancing the structural power of the nonhegemonic riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.
Introduction
This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. "Cornucopian" and "Neo-Malthusian" perspectives have traditionally differed in foreseeing pessimistic or optimistic scenarios over riparian dynamics. "Cornucopian" approaches emphasize the abundance of available resources and the need to put an economic value on water, since the problem is often one of mismanagement, not scarcity (Allan, 2001; Gleditsch, 1998: 381) . Hence, many economic approaches advocate cooperation through pricing, water markets or demand management, as effective ways to diffuse potential conflicts over water (Allan & Mallat, 1995; Dinar et al., 1997; Fisher, 2001) . For others, these approaches often do not resonate with doi: 10.2166/wp.2008.204 Water Policy 10 Supplement 2 (2008) 89-102 q IWA Publishing 2008 the actual needs in many of the developing countries of the world as they reflect the experience of developed countries in the industrialized northern hemisphere (Turton et al., 2005) . Neo-Functionalists also predict that cooperation in low politics (economics and other less strategic and less prominent state activities) will "spill over" into high politics (sovereignty and security matters) (Mitrany, 1975) . However, a lack of cooperation in high politics can also lead to a similar deadlock in low politics (Lowi, 1993) . Under regime theory, regional institutions act as efficient tools to manage cooperative regimes for natural resources (Young, 1989; Jägerskog, 2003) .
The concept of environmental security has made its mark on the pre-existing debate on resourceoriented conflicts (Westing, 1986; Mathews, 1989: 162) . "Environmental security" is linked to very high risks of violent conflict because of acute change or stress in resources (such as water scarcity and extreme pollution), often accompanied by high population growth and a socially inequitable distribution of resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 6 -8) . Their inherent call for population control in water-scarce regions give a "Neo-Malthusian" dimension to this perspective. Recent research findings on the part of the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, for example, suggest a link between relative scarcities and different intensities of conflict (Toset et al., 2000) . In addition, scarcity may be less important than topographic issues, as the likelihood for increased military conflict seems to increase when rivers cross borders rather than forming borders, as this creates an upstream/downstream dynamic (Toset et al., 2000: 971) . Others consider the link between environmental degradation and/or change in water resource allocation as a threat to State security, without establishing this as a prime reason for armed conflicts (Lowi & Shaw, 2000: 149; Wolf & Hamner, 2000: 123) . Hegemonic Stability Theory proposed by Neo-Realists involves an account of how a hegemon, i.e. the most powerful actor, manages to impose its own policies on the others (Lowi, 1993) . Under conditions of asymmetry, a conflict occurs among riparians only if in the hegemon's interest (Lowi, 1993) . There is also a greater risk of conflict when downstream riparians are more powerful and suffer from upstream development (Frey & Naff, 1985; Naff, 1994) . The identification of structural and bargaining power, as two facets of asymmetry, and the resort to issue-linkage strategies by vulnerable riparians to achieve short term cooperation, have further pushed the debate away from alarmist predictions over water wars; power is derived from geographical position, military and economic assets, as well as strategies and tactics (Daoudy, 2004 (Daoudy, , 2005 (Daoudy, , 2008b . The emerging theoretical framework of hydro-hegemony seeks to clarify hydro-politics from the perspective of hegemonised in their interaction with international basin hegemons (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) . This paper is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. It departs in that sense from the examination of the weaknesses of International Water Law and Treaty Law in recognizing and addressing covert expressions of ideational power, by Woodhouse and Zeitoun in this issue. On the one hand, the structure of interaction is understood as the "rules of the game" which constrain States' actions and the options available to them (Daoudy, 2005) . On the other hand, weaker actors can also back their claims on legal principles in their interaction with basin hegemons, thus enhancing their bargaining margins. A process of crystallization of international principles in relation to State behaviour in international watercourses has been launched and resulted in the adoption of the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses on 21 May 1997 (United Nations, 1997). As noted by McCaffrey, by setting "basic parameters governing the conduct of State riparians to these watercourses", the Convention represents an "instrument (. . .) that reflects a consensus as to the principles that are applicable in the field" (McCaffrey, 2001a: 261) . It thus allows riparian States to appeal to this body of rules as principles of International Water Law.
The first section of the paper analyses main principles of International Water Law that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference. The second part will show how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have rejected or used these principles to further their interests. The stakes are considerable. Since 1980, upstream Turkey has been building a mega-development project called the GAP (Great Anatolian Project or Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi), consisting of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The ultimate objective is to irrigate about 1.7 million hectares in the Harran Valley and produce 27 billion kilowatt hours annually, thus the equivalent of 19% of the country's total irrigable area and 22% of its total hydro-electric needs (Republic of Turkey, 2008) . Turkey also aims at compensating the lack of oil resources while developing and stabilizing one of its most under-developed regions, South-East Anatolia, where a majority of the Kurdish population is established. Downstream on the rivers, Iraq and Syria would be considerably impacted by the GAP Project, once it is finalized. Syria's current and projected projects on the Euphrates will increase the pressure on Iraq, located the farthest downstream. The three co-riparians met on a regular basis from 1962 to 1993, to discuss issues relating to respective water developments in the Euphrates and Tigris Basins. Information has been exchanged over more than forty years, and experts have established a water-related modus vivendi based on three bilateral agreements reached in 1987, 1989 and 2001 . Faced with the steady progress of the GAP project and the deadlock in negotiations, downstream Syria started to employ linkage strategies in its interactions with Turkey over water and security. From 1984 to 1998, Syria's support to Kurdish armed rebellions within Turkey, through the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) and its leader Abdullah Ö calan, represented an important bargaining chip which impacted on Turkey's security alternatives and brought the upstream riparian to sign the first bilateral water agreement in 1987 (see Daoudy, 2005 Daoudy, , 2008b . The relationship has evolved over the years depending on the regional context, the strategies that were deployed and the link between the water dispute and wider strategic issues. In March 2008, the three co-riparians officially declared their will to cooperate over shared waters by establishing a joint water institute with experts from each country. At the end of May 2008, the Iraqi Water Resources Minister visited Syria and Turkey, to discuss the resumption of trilateral talks and agree on flow increases from upstream sources into the two rivers. A process of conflict transformation, rather than conflict resolution, has taken place, as recent agreements have not addressed volumetric allocations, nor dealt with current and future qualitative impacts on shared waters (Daoudy, 2008a) .
Competing claims from the 1960s to the early 2000s will be analysed to see how actors have derived negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. The analysis will draw on debates within the United Nations' International Law Commission that led to the adoption of the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Official declarations and positions on the voting and the consecutive ratification of the Convention by respective (upstream and downstream) riparians provide useful insights on the dynamics in the Euphrates and Tigris basins. The following section will disentangle claims and counter-claims laid during the bilateral and trilateral negotiation rounds. The analysis of International Water Law as a significant source of structural and bargaining power, is expected to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics underlying water cooperation and conflict in the Middle East, and globally.
Genesis and summary of principles of International Water Law
Four different perspectives on the utilisation of watercourses for non-navigational purposes have emerged since the end of the 19th century from decisions of international courts and tribunals: Absolute territorial sovereignty; Absolute territorial integrity; Limited territorial sovereignty; and Community of interests. Five general principles outline basic rights and obligations over water systems: no harm principle 1 ; good neighbourly relations; procedural obligations of cooperation, information, consultation and negotiation; the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization; optimal utilization with the objective to reach sustainable development and proportionality.
In 1895, the Harmon Doctrine-named after the United States' prosecutor at the time-came to prominence for an attempt at absolute US territorial sovereignty on its portions of the Rio Grande River. With downstream Mexico advocating the principle of territorial integrity, this principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty was never implemented (McCaffrey, 1996: 549-590) . The concept of the Harmon Doctrine-and links of transboundary rivers with sovereignty-have persisted well into the 20th century, however. Limited territorial sovereignty emerged as a counterbalance to the State's total sovereignty, implying the obligation not to cause significant harm to others. Between 1911 and 1979, the International Law Institute (ILI) adopted various resolutions in relation to shared water resources, by establishing, inter alia, the need for allocation on an equitable basis, and the prohibition for upstream countries to considerably impact on downstream uses. The opinion given by writers and commentators carried symbolic weight but no executive force on States. Several arbitral awards and decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) introduced the obligation to limit damages inflicted to other parties and prior notification to other riparians in case of significant impacts on the river's flow 2 .
In the same line, the International Law Association (ILA), a prestigious private institution dedicated to legal research, issued in 1966 what would later to be referred to as the Helsinki Rules (International Law Association, 1966) . They represented the first attempt to codify rights and obligations over international watercourses, in relation to navigation but also other types of utilization. Articles IV to VII introduced the principle of equitable and reasonable use (Art. IV), geographical, historical, hydrological, social, climatic and technical parameters (Art. V), on which disputing States should base their claims with reference to other utilizations of the waters. The notion of community of interests in the management of river basins would be reflected in successive legal texts, in particular in the efforts deployed by the United Nations. In 1970, the UN General Assembly gave a mandate to its legal body, the International Law Commission (ILC), to codify progressive developments in the rules relating to international watercourse for uses other than navigation. A first text with 32 articles was issued in 1991 and a final multilateral treaty of 37 articles, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, was approved on 21 May 1997 by the General Assembly and open to signatures until 2000.
1 Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 2 The Trail Smelter arbitration (1941), the Lake Lanoux arbitral award (1957) , and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Corfu Channel Case (1949) and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (1997) . With the Pulp Mill Case, the ICJ is currently further examining Argentina's legal right to stop the construction of paper mills by Uruguay on the Uruguay River because of possible environmental impacts on the river.
3. The ILC, the 1997 UN Convention and their relevance for structural power
The 1997 UN Convention established the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and no harm done to other co-riparians. Harm would be valued in quantitative and qualitative terms (McCaffrey, 2001b: 348) . Harm avoidance did not however imply the obligation for the river to be kept free from transformation. The prevalence of the principle of equitable utilization on the prohibition to inflict harm indicated the right of upstream riparians to carry projects on their portion of the watercourse. This weakened the notion of prior use, and the Convention failed to bring about a full protection for existing utilizations (McCaffrey, 2001b: 339) . However, the upstream State's freedom in exploiting the shared watercourse would be limited by the principle of proportionality and equitable utilization. States would be under the obligation to take all appropriate measures not to cause significant harm to other riparian States (Art. 7). If harm was incurred, a process of consultation and compensation would be initiated amongst riparians. The rule of equitable utilization obliquely embedded some protection of the principle of prior use, as riparian states would need to evaluate the impact of their projects in relation to their co-riparians' hydraulic, economic and social needs, the populations that depended on the watercourse, and current and potential uses (Art. 6). The debate remained unfinished as to the weight given to each category of needs, leaving the definition of equitable and reasonable utilization open to interpretations.
Caflisch highlights the Convention's inherent "obligation to cooperate", as the States' "common interests call for rules of cooperation" (Caflisch, 1989: 186) . McCaffrey notes, moreover, that the rule of equitable use embodies a process of co-operation which strongly depends on the interaction between States sharing the resource (McCaffrey, 2001b: 345) . The Convention clearly established the right for riparian States to request information on projected work over the watercourse, the need for prior notification and consultation. If opposition persisted, they would enter into negotiation and, in case of failure, turn to mediation or conciliation via a third party (Article 33.2), or an impartial commission (Article 33.3).The text specified also the rules for the settlement of disputes, such as the resort to the International Court of Justice (Article 33.10.a) or to arbitration (Article 33. 10.b).
Heated debates took place during the drafting of the UN Convention by the International Law Commission. The official declarations issued by States and the consecutive voting records are significant elements for the understanding of International Water Law and its instrumentalisation as a source of power by riparian States. It is worth noting that a few upstream countries, amongst which Turkey, have voted against the adoption of the following paragraphs: the relation between the Convention and preexisting agreements on watercourses (Art. 3) 3 , equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation to cause no harm (Arts 5 to 7) 4 , prior notification (Art. 12) 5 , and the dispute settlement procedures (Art. 33) 6 . While agreeing with the "essence" of the Convention, Turkish experts have justified the rejection by stressing Turkey's concerns with future negotiations over the allocation and management of the Euphrates and Tigris waters and their reluctance over an instrument which would "unilaterally limit, in terms of quantity and quality, the rights of States from which originate the watercourses" (Kibaroglu, 2002: 257-258) . The appeal to a wider interpretation of equitable and reasonable utilization has reinforced upstream perspectives based on "the basic principle of a State's sovereign rights over its territory", and the claim in favour of equitable utilization over the obligation not to cause harm (Kibaroglu, 2002) . Together with China and Burundi, Turkey in the end voted against the adoption of the Convention 7 . Syria, on the other hand, was amongst the first 16 countries to sign the Convention 8 , and the first five countries ratifying the Convention 9 . Iraq indicated its adhesion in 2001 10 . The Convention has not as yet been ratified by a sufficient number of countries to enter into force as conventional international law. But as stated by McCaffrey, "the success of the Convention does not seem to depend on whether it enters into force" (McCaffrey, 2001a: 261) . And given that five Middle Eastern countries out of the 16 signatories were among the first to sign or adhere to the Convention (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Qatar in chronological order), a regional custom on water utilization seems to be emerging. In addition, the Convention has codified principles which have been also reinforced through international case law. It is significant that, to the exception of South-Africa 11 , basin hegemons have not signed or ratified the UN Convention.
International Water Law as a source of structural power for non-hegemons: the obligation to cooperate
Preliminary insights reveal resistance on the part of the upstream riparian State and basin hegemon, in this case, to any potential changes made to the rules of the game under its control, i.e. the structure of interaction, which would result from the emergence of international principles of water law. Sources of structural power can be based on the assets, economic and military resources that are possessed by States. Riparian positions are also significant as upstream actors benefit from a geographic advantage. By extension, sources of structural power include agenda-setting, control and mobilisation of resources and alliances and the capacity to "turn the tap" (Daoudy, 2005) . In this case, for the period under study, Turkey, as the relatively more powerful and upstream riparian, possesses a much greater share of structural power in relation to Syria and Iraq. Downstream countries can however mobilise structural factors such as the codification of new legal "rules" on watercourses to bring upstream riparians to cooperate, and therefore acquire enhanced structural power. In doing this, they also improve their bargaining position towards basin hegemons. International law appears therefore as a source of structural and bargaining power. Competing interpretations of "equitable and reasonable utilisation", "no harm", "prior notification" and other legal principles between riparian States started over basic definitions of International Water Law, and persisted through each of its main principles. An examination of the conflictual assertions reveals a field ripe in the use of bargaining power. Water's somewhat unique feature of serving multiple uses may make it particularly effective for bargaining power and the capacity to "expand the pie" of negotiations. Apart from water used for domestic consumption, primarily in cities, water is used to grow food and in the service industry. River flows may furthermore be used to generate electricity or tourism revenues, or for the production of bio-fuels. This is witnessed in Turkey's focus on optimizing the uses of the common resources rather than their equitable utilization. Bargaining strategies aim at worsening the other party's alternatives, and impacting on mutual perceptions. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert and address situations of power asymmetry by weakening the hegemon's alternatives, thereby reducing its degrees of freedom. Power can therefore be defined in relational terms and is not exclusively determined by possession or structure (Daoudy, 2005) . This section identifies power strategies based on the use or rejection of International Water Law, and the main positions and counter-positions adopted in the negotiation process.
Transboundary waters vs. international watercourses
Turkey opposed the interpretation made by the ILC of "international watercourses" and the regime advocated for their management, by stressing the need to consider States' "sovereignty over their natural resources" (International Law Commission, 1993: 173, 181 & 186) . The appeal to absolute territorial integrity was reiterated in official publications which considered the Euphrates and Tigris rivers as "Turkish rivers as long as they flow on Turkish territory" (Republic of Turkey, 1992: 10). This position was later re-affirmed when Syria raised objections to the construction of the Bireçik Dam, located upstream on the Euphrates: "Turkey wishes to reiterate that the Euphrates and Tigris are transboundary rivers and consequently Syrian claims are not only inapplicable (. . .) but also unacceptable" (SAR, Verbal Note by Turkey dated 13 October 1993, in response to Syria's official complaint of 18 July 1993).
The difference is subtle but important. International rivers cross the territory of several sovereign States, entitled by international law to share the waters along a dividing mid-line called Thalweg; transboundary waters cross borders and are not subject to the same dividing lines by international law (Chalaby & Majzoub, 1995: 210) . The ILC considered a watercourse to be international if it stretched over different States (Art. 2.b). Syria and Iraq promoted this definition during the deliberations held within the ILC (ILC, 1980: 152; 1993: 173) , and through their official publications. Iraq would state that "the Euphrates and Tigris are international rivers according to the definition of international river that was internationally accepted, as watercourses running in different States", for which "collective property applies" (Republic of Iraq, 1999: 56-60) . Syria refuted as well the point made about "the two rivers being transboundary and not international" and backed its claims on historic agreements reached with Turkey in the 1920s and 1940s, and in 1987, pointing to Turkey's responsibility towards downstream countries and its recognition of the Euphrates as an international watercourse (SAR, Verbal Note from Syria to Turkey, 2 December 1995: 4; Rifai, 1998: 121) 12 . Turkey, in turn, referred to the 1946 agreement with Iraq as a framework which offered no limit to "sovereign rights to build infrastructures in order to regulate flows in Turkish territory", and the 1987 Protocol as a proof of its "good will" and respect for "good neighbourly relations" (Inan, 1994: 235 ; SAR, Verbal Note from Turkey to Syria, 30 December 1995: 1). Turkish official and non official sources also laid downstream claims to upstream Syria on the Orontes River, upon which Lebanon and Syria sit upstream of Turkey (Republic of Turkey, 1996: 8; Turkey Today, 1996) 13 . Turkey's attempt to include the Orontes waters on the negotiation agenda dated back to early bilateral negotiation rounds held with Syria in 1962, 1969 and 1971, a claim then rejected by Syria in the trilateral round of 1983 on the ground that the Orontes waters were not common to the three countries, Iraq not being a riparian to it (Daoudy, 2005) .
Equitable and reasonable utilisation vs. rational and optimal utilization (Single basin, standardization and exchange of data)
The content and meaning of equitable and reasonable utilization has also been strongly debated by the basin hegemon, in an attempt to limit its application and to frame parameters to its advantage. Turkey's requests would be perceived by the downstream riparians as an attempt by the basin hegemon to increase its control over the common waters and resist any allocation of the common waters.
In 1997, the Turkish press quoted former President Demirel saying that "Turkey would in no way share its water resources with Syria and Iraq", but added that Ankara would "consider cooperation with these countries over a rational utilization of regional water resources" (Republic of Turkey, 1997). Turkey officially referred to "equitable and reasonable utilization", while pointing to the need for "a flexible interpretation as the core objective would be to find a balance between different interests" (Republic of Turkey, 1990: 6 ). Turkey's Three Stage Plan for the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers hence introduced the concept of "rational and optimal" utilization, based on the possibility for downstream 12 Syria refers to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and the bilateral Conventions of 1920 and 1946 signed between France and Great Britain over the Euphrates and Tigris waters, at the time of European mandates over Syria and Iraq. In 1916, France and Great Britain held secret negotiations on the Middle East; the two powers adopted a clause "guaranteeing the quantity of water coming from the Euphrates and Tigris" (Hokayem & Bittar, 1981) . The 1921 Convention, signed between the French Mandate in Syria and Turkey, introduced the notion of equitable distribution of the Kweik waters, a tributary of the Euphrates, mainly for the city of Aleppo (League of Nations 1926 -1927 . This clause was reiterated five years later in another treaty between the French Mandate and Turkey (League of Nations 1926 -1927 . 13 The treaty signed in 1939 had a significant impact on future hydro-strategic relations between Syria and Turkey. In exchange for Turkey's participation to War efforts and to impede a German occupation of Syria, the French Mandate officially handed over the Syrian Sandjak of Iskandaroun-later named Hatay Province by Turkey-in which lived an important Turkish minority (League of Nations 1940 -1944 . Syria considered the territorial split and "loss" initiated by France to be illegal, since portions of national territory and populations were handed over without any consultation of the largely Arabic local population (Mardam Bey, 1994) . Since then, Turkey acquired an enhanced upstream position towards Syria on the Orontes River. Syrian official maps have consistently included Iskandaroun within national borders. Historical claims on the Sandjak/Hatay have represented a persistent linkage strategy by Syria in its interactions over water with Turkey, until their recent rapprochement witnessed in the early 2000s. Since then, the issue has not been officially raised between the two neighbours. See Daoudy, 2005 Daoudy, , 2008b countries to resort to the Tigris waters, and pointed to the "inequitable and uneconomical" irrigation of infertile of land in Syria and Iraq, to the detriment of fertile fields in Turkey (Republic of Turkey, 1996: 7; Republic of Turkey, 2002a) . The notion of "equity" was interpreted as the "integration of those who were in a disadvantaged social, cultural or economic position within a development process", initiated by the GAP project (Republic of Turkey, 2002b) . This notion of rational and optimal use and development was reinforced by a rejection of allocation in favour of scientific standards which would be achieved through the collection and standardization of data between the three countries. This claim first appeared in the trilateral talks held in 1984 and was regularly reiterated in the negotiations held until 1988, and in later in official publications (Daoudy, 2005) .
The upstream riparian hence suggested to review all water and land resources (quality of soil, drainage infrastructures), and each country's irrigation techniques (Republic of Turkey, 2002b, c) . Starting from the trilateral negotiations of 1980, 1988 and 1989 , Turkey suggested to proceed on the assumption that the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers constituted a single basin, thus advocating "centralized planning of all dam projects within the two basins and across the three countries" (Daoudy, 2005: 178) . This claim laid on the fact that the two rivers rose in Turkey, they eventually met in Iraq to form the Shatt al-Arab, and that most of the fertile lands and ambitious projects were found in Turkey, allowing it to export across the Middle East (Republic of Turkey, 2002a). In the same negotiation round, Syria requested the separation of water infrastructures as they irrigated different regions and countries. For Iraq, the "geographical, hydrological and topographic" reality indicated a separation within two distinct basins rather than a single one (Republic of Iraq, 1999: 67).
Allocation on the basis of prior use (Iraq, Syria) vs. allocation of utilizations (Turkey)
Further interpretations of the principle of "prior use" and "allocation" served to enhance each party's positions in the process. The upstream riparian offered, for example, its own understanding of "water allocation". To quote a verbal [official] note from Turkey to Syria in 1995: "What Turkey understands from the "allocation of water", as is confirmed by the recent developments in International Law, has always been and still is, not the distribution of water between the concerned countries but an "allocation of uses of water" on an equitable and reasonable basis, taking into account all the relevant factors and circumstances" (Syrian Arab Republic, 1995: 1) . This interpretation offered the basin hegemon an opportunity to avoid the issue of water allocation while appealing to cooperation, by suggesting a common and agreed distribution of projects amongst co-riparians. For downstream countries, it was perceived as yet another attempt to favour Turkey which already benefits from the "structural" topographical position. Iraq's response addressed Turkey's rejection of the internationally recognized principle of equitable and reasonable utilization in favour of optimal utilization, in contradiction with past negotiations gathered to share the common waters (Republic of Iraq, 1999: 39, 62-64) . Iraq also based its response on the ICJ case of 1997 which concluded to the illicit nature of unilateral works carried out on the Danube River 14 . Iraq further claimed the prevalence of prior use, on the basis of its millenary-long exploitation of the Euphrates and Tigris, which was guaranteed by bilateral conventions signed with Turkey and International Law (Republic of Iraq, 1999: 48 -49, 66) . In debating the text of the UN Convention, Iraq specifically suggested 14 The International Court of Justice Case on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (1997). to include the importance of existing uses in comparison to potential uses (ILC, 1993: 173 )-a claim relayed by Syria in its official publications (Farah, 1994: 26; Kasm, 1996: 31-36) . Turkey addressed these demands by highlighting Iraq and Syria's request for increased flows when they had inflated the surface of their irrigated land (Republic of Turkey, 1996: 18) . In response, Syria rejected the principle of optimal utilization as it would favour Turkey's claims for additional amounts of water on the basis of fertile lands and higher economic yields. It further outlined a contradiction with Art. 5 of the UN Convention which did not condition access to water on the basis of land quality or the level of technical development (Kasm, 1996: 25-26) . For Syria, Turkey's claims served to delay the process of water distribution to the finalization of the GAP Project (Kasm, 1996: 27) .
Obligation not to cause harm, to notify and consult other co-riparians
The respective positions of Turkey, Syria and Iraq on "no harm", "notification" and "consultation" will be summarised in this section. The analysis of official declarations and bilateral notes shows that, in line with a sovereignty-based approach, Turkey expressed strong reservations about the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparians. In its comments to the ILC project in 1993, Turkey stressed its right to develop and considered the no harm obligation as "a limitation on the utilization of watercourses by upstream countries" (ILC, 1993: 186) . Syria, on the other hand, asked for the prevalence of the obligation not to cause harm over the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and backed its claims on the ICJ case of 1997 (SAR, Verbal Note by State Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Embassy in Damascus, 1999: 6) . Harm was characterized in terms of water pollution resulting from upstream projects, such as the pollution of the Balikh waters (a tributary of the Euphrates) after completion of the Bireçik Dam (SAR, Verbal Note from Syria to Turkey, 2 December 1995: 5). Syria also complained about not being consulted by Turkey, and this was specifically articulated in relation to Ilisu Dam planned on the Tigris (SAR, 1999: 1) . Iraq pointed also to the gradual salinization of its waters resources, resulting from a decrease or cut in volumes reaching its territory (Jamalo, 1996: 57, 61) , and this accusation was particularly emphasized during the last round of negotiation held in October 1992 (Daoudy, 2005: 184) . Turkey's response was to deny "unacceptable" accusations of pollution when the GAP Project remained at an early stage of completion; the Three Stages Plan offered, in addition, "a good basis for consultation on environmental problems" (SAR, Verbal Note from Turkey to Syria, 30 December 1995: 2).
International Water Law as a source of bargaining power for basin hegemons and nonhegemons
Despite deliberately conflicting interpretations over "equitable and reasonable utilization", "no harm", "prior notification" and "consultation", a process of cooperation has emerged over the years between the co-riparians of the Euphrates and Tigris. Climatic and hydraulic data were exchanged, annual visits carried out in respective capitals and technical information conveyed in relation to the filling of dams. From 1960 to 1980, Turkey showed a will to coordinate projects with its neighbours. In 1964, the upstream riparian referred to the need to have an "equitable distribution of the common waters"-a notion that would later be replaced by a "flexible" interpretation of the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause harm and the need to notify and consult co-riparians.
Turkey has indeed initiated a process of notification through regular exchanges of official notes over the years, but the process has remained legally incomplete (Riedel, 1996: 78) . The resort to prior notification, even if incomplete, served to enhance Turkey's bargaining power as it showed efforts towards cooperation with co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris. At the same time, it sustained diplomatic battles with Iraq and Syria over the characterization of the Euphrates and Tigris as international rivers, the meaning of equitable and reasonable utilization and limitations to the obligation not to cause harm. A cooperative regime was also suggested by Turkish experts around an equitable and reasonable utilization of waters on each side of the rivers, individual and joint mechanism for the prevention and reduction of pollution, a common inventory of water and land, prior notification for projects with potentially harmful impacts, benefits to all through flood control and the need for decreased flows downstream in light of the reevaluation of irrigated surfaces in Syria and Iraq (Bilen, 1994: 103-107, 114; Kibaroglu, 1998: 281-290) . This interpretation of International Water Law gave priority to Turkish projects on the basis of optimality and efficiency, but would lead Syria and Iraq to give up some of their agricultural projects (Scheumann, 1998: 128) . According to international experts, a full implementation of the GAP will ultimately withdraw a maximum of 70% of the Euphrates natural flow (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991) and about 40% of its observed flow (Kliot, 1994) . A combination of upstream projects in Turkey and Syria will place the lowest downstream riparian (Iraq) in a vulnerable position (Daoudy, 2005) . While the GAP Project unfolds, some experts have argued that the principles of harm avoidance, proportionality and equitable utilization were disregarded at the time of the completion of the Atatürk Dam by Turkey in 1990, when the flow of the Euphrates river was completely cut for a month (Riedel, 1996: 78) .
The resort to principles of International Water Law has therefore represented an important strategy on the part of Iraq and Syria, in countering upstream unilateral projects. Turkey's claims were perceived by the downstream riparians as an attempt by the basin hegemon to increase its control over the common waters and resist any allocation of the common waters. The appeal to prior use was a constant claim on the part of Iraq, justifiably because of its position furthest downstream. This principle has however not been recognized by the 1997 UN Convention, although existing utilisations are included in the evaluation of equitable practices. Syria has also resisted Turkey's strategy to frame riparian cooperation around standards of efficiency and optimality to its benefits, by claiming an equitable and reasonable utilization of the common waters.
Conclusions
By virtue of crossing national boundaries, flowing surface waters force riparian states into a situation of interdependence. The mutual dependency is aggravated by the fact that, despite three bilateral agreements reached in 1987, 1989 and 2001 , the co-riparians of the Euphrates and Tigris have not yet succeeded in reaching a comprehensive water-sharing agreement.
This paper has analyzed upstream, mid-and downstream positions, their evolution over time from 1962 to the early 2000s, at the peak of the co-riparians' conflict over the common water resources. Until the early 2000s, Syria's interests colluded with Iraq's quest for water security in the face of Turkey's upstream projects. After the Iraq War of 2003, Syria's national security concerns and threat perceptions led to coalition-building with the powerful Turkish neighbor. This was eased by the settlement of their pending "Kurdish issue" through the Adana Protocol of 1998, when Syria gave up its bargaining leverage derived from its support to PKK (Daoudy, 2008b) . Since then, Turkey has addressed the water dispute from a benefit sharing perspective, and joint projects and the sharing of expertise have been advocated (Daoudy, 2008b) . Claims and counter-claims presented in face-to-face negotiations and outside their strict framework of such formal negotiations have been confronted with arguments based on the codified principles of international law for the protection and management of shared water resources and each country's interpretation of these principles.
The negotiation, power and law framework analyzed in this paper offers a summary of the three co-riparians' positions. It also reveals the links between hydro-hegemony and International Water Law. International legal principles offer new power-based opportunities to downstream riparians in the negotiation process. Their structural power is enhanced through the reinforcement of international customary rules of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause harm and prior notification. A first conclusion thus points to the understanding of International Water Law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors' constraints and options and enhancing the non-hegemonic riparians' structural power. Turkey's rejection of the 1997 UN Convention may be indicative of its hegemonic status. The UN Convention of 1997 has established the priority of the rule of equitable and reasonable utilization, thus allowing for projects to be carried out upstream if they respect the principle of proportionality. Downstream riparians are therefore not legally entitled to call for a halt in upstream projects on the basis of prior use. But upstream riparians or basin hegemons are under the obligation to consider their co-riparians' socio-economic and environmental needs (as stated in Art. 6) and the potential negative impacts of their projects. As basin hegemon (and upstream riparian), Turkey upheld the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, in contradiction with the principles of the Convention, as well as all subsequent developments in the field of International Water Law. It has also been careful not to completely disregard International Water Law, but offered its own interpretation of the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and harm avoidance. In addition, International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. Non-hegemonic riparians could therefore appeal to International Water Law, when interacting with basin hegemons. This resort to international legal principles serves also to increase Iraq and Syria's bargaining power, though downstream riparians were unable to legally back their claims on prior use. As a source of bargaining power, international principles increase downstream riparians' legitimacy and enhance their bargaining position in the negotiation process. However strategic they could be, their impact remains limited as no central authority can legally enforce customary principles establishing the obligation to cooperate and the community of interests over shared waters.
